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“THE STEPFORD JUSTICES”: THE NEED FOR
EXPERIENTIAL DIVERSITY ON THE ROBERTS
COURT
TIMOTHY P. O’NEILL*
Is it finally over?
I mean the Roberts Court’s “Era of Good Feeling.”
Please, may we all stop singing Kumbaya  and go back to being our irascible1
selves?
Was it really less than two years ago when a sophisticated legal analyst such
as Jeffrey Rosen could—with a straight face—provide this account of an
interview with Chief Justice John Roberts: “[John] Marshall’s example had
taught him, Roberts said, that personal trust in the chief justice’s lack of an
ideological agenda was very important.”   Or how about, “Roberts said he had2
not thought about the sources of his own interest in unity and consensus and
bringing people together or whether there was anything in his upbringing that
might account for it.”3
The final score of the 2006 Term?  Out of seventy-two cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided twenty-four—fully one-third of its docket—by a vote
of 5-4.  This constitutes the highest percentage of 5-4 decisions in a Term in at
least a decade.   Moreover, the percentage of unanimous decisions was only4
25%—the second lowest of the last decade.5
Roberts also told Rosen that “I think it’s bad, long-term, if people identify the
rule of law with how individual justices vote.”6
The twenty-four decisions that were 5-4?  Justice Anthony Kennedy was with
the majority in every single one.7
* Professor, The John Marshall Law School.  I wish to thank John Marshall for providing
me with a research sabbatical that facilitated the writing of this article.  I also wish to
acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Danielle Vakoutis, Daniel Saeedi, and David
Machemer.  This Article is dedicated to my mother Virginia O’Neill, who throughout my life
has helped me in ways too numerous to mention. 
1. Kumbaya is a folk song popularly associated with the Civil Rights Movement,
Scouting, the YMCA, and Catholic folk masses.  See Eric Zorn, Poor ‘Kumbaya’ Deserves
Better Fate— Seriously, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 2006, at 1.
2. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT
DEFINED AMERICA 226 (2007).
3. Id. at 229.
4. SCOTUSblog.com, SCOTUSblog End-of-Term “Super StatPack”–OT06, at 1 (June 28,
2007), http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/SuperStatPack.pdf.
5. Id. at 2.
6. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 226.
7. SCOTUSblog.com, supra note 4, at 3.
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This article contends that in order to understand the Roberts Court, you must
first appreciate the unique position it holds in American history.  Although it is
hopelessly split ideologically, in many ways it is the most homogeneous
collection of justices ever to sit on the Supreme Court. 
For the first time in history every justice had been a judge on the U.S. Court
of Appeals at the time of appointment to the Supreme Court.8
For the first time in history eight out of nine justices graduated from the same
three Ivy League law schools.  9
For the first time in history no justice has had legislative experience at any
level—local, state, or federal.10
For the first time in history no justice has ever held—or even run for—
elective public office of any kind.11
Ideologically, the Court is hopelessly split.  But in terms of educational
background and legal experience, they are truly “The Stepford Justices.”
This unprecedented narrowness of the justices’ governmental experience can
be attributed to the transformation in both the nomination and confirmation of
Supreme Court justices that occurred in reaction to the failure of Robert Bork’s
8. All the justices came directly from judgeships on the following circuits: District of
Columbia (John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg); First (David
Souter, Stephen Breyer); Third (Samuel Alito); Seventh (John Paul Stevens); and Ninth
(Anthony Kennedy).  See A Divided Group: A Brief Look at the Nine Supreme Court Justices
and How They Voted Saturday, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 10, 2000, at A26 [hereinafter A
Divided Group] (listing the prior judicial positions and educational backgrounds of Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas); Bush Chooses Roberts for Chief
Justice, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 6. 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Bush Chooses Roberts] (discussing
the prior judicial positions and educational background of Chief Justice Roberts); David D.
Kirkpatrick, Advocacy Groups Prepare New Ad Campaigns on Alito, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006,
at A14 (discussing the prior judicial positions and educational background of Justice Alito); see
also Oyez: Roberts Court (2006-), http://www.oyez.org/courts/roberts/robt2/ (last visited Feb.
25, 2008) (listing biographical information of the 2006 Roberts Court).  Since the founding of
the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1891, there has never been a Supreme Court composed entirely
of former court of appeals judges until now.
9. Eight of the justices graduated from either Harvard Law School (Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer), Yale Law School (Thomas and Alito), or Columbia Law School
(Ginsburg).  Stevens is the only graduate of a non-Ivy League law school: Northwestern.  See
A Divided Group, supra note 8; Bush Chooses Roberts, supra note 8; Kirkpatrick, supra note
8; Oyez: Roberts Court (2006-), supra note 8; see also Richard Cohen, Editorial, Ivy-Covered
Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at A21 (noting how the Court is dominated by Ivy League
college graduates).
10. See infra notes 165-68; see also Oyez: Justices by Court, http://www.oyez.org/courts/
(last visited Mar. 19, 2008) (revealing that in all previous Courts, at least one justice had
previously served in some legislative capacity). 
11. See Oyez: Justices by Court, supra note 10.  All of the offices listed infra note 165 were
elective offices.
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nomination in 1987.  On the one hand, politics as usual has dictated that
presidents try to appoint justices who will carry out their particular ideological
agendas.  On the other hand, presidents must now sell each nominee both to the
U.S. Senate and to the American public as a non-ideological, expert legal
technician.  Hence, since Bork all seven confirmed justices have been U.S. Court
of Appeals judges who attended either Harvard or Yale Law School.   The one12
failed nominee—Harriet Miers—was a Southern Methodist University Law
School graduate who had never been a judge.  This mania for Ivy League judges
may have reached its apotheosis when President Bush introduced his most recent
nominee, Samuel Alito, by describing him as a graduate of both Princeton and
Yale Law School and then noting that he had “more prior judicial experience
than any Supreme Court nominee in more than [seventy] years.”  13
This trend has had two pernicious effects.  First, it has resulted in a Supreme
Court with remarkably little experience in government outside the judicial
branch.  The lack of a justice who has ever sat in a legislature or even once
campaigned for political office of any kind is quite disturbing for a court that
does everything from reviewing the constitutionality of legislation to deciding
campaign finance reform cases.
Second, telling the American public that legal expertise can somehow trump
ideological concerns is unwise, if not downright dishonest.  The public has every
right to be confused when Ivy League-educated judges—who were sold to them
for their legal prowess—continually split 5-4 on the crucial legal issues of the
day.  The confusion this engenders in the public can easily morph into cynicism.
This article is divided into four parts.  Part I discusses two very different
models of Supreme Court jurisprudence.  In the earlier model, Henry Hart and
Erwin Griswold described judging as the application of legal reasoning and
analysis to the facts of the case, thus leading to the proper resolution.  In the
more recent model, Richard Posner and Stanley Fish contend that the reality of
judging is exactly the opposite: A judge’s starting “premises” or “values” will
immediately suggest an outcome to the judge.  The judge then uses theory not
to reach a decision, but rather to justify the decision she has already reached. 
Part I also discusses how the work of various Supreme Court justices has
conformed to either the Hart-Griswold or Posner-Fish models.  The article pays
particular attention to the work method of the most overlooked member of the
12. Although Ruth Bader Ginsburg graduated from Columbia Law School, she attended
Harvard Law School before transferring.  See A Divided Group, supra note 8; Cohen, supra
note 9.
13. See President George W. Bush, Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 41 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1625, 1626 (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2005_presidential_documents&docid=pd07no05_txt-7.pdf.
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Warren Court—Charles Evans Whittaker.  Whittaker’s tenure on the Court
reflects the problems—indeed, the tragedy—of a justice trying to follow the
dictates of the Hart-Griswold theory.
Part II focuses on the work of mathematician Kurt Gödel.  Gödel proved that
a man-made, formal system such as mathematics could not be both complete and
consistent.  Gödel proved that in any such system there must be at least one
axiom that is true but unprovable.  A broad analogy is then drawn between
Gödel’s theorem and the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court: The very nature of
the cases the Court selects for review will necessitate Court decisions that can
be characterized as true yet unprovable.  The decisions are true in the very
limited sense that whatever five members of the Court agree on becomes true—
at least for the time being.  Nevertheless, they are also unprovable because the
cases selected for review a fortiori are the ones that exist in the lacunae between
varying interpretations of law.  Thus, the traditional tools of legal analysis have
already failed to resolve these cases.  Even a unanimous Supreme Court decision
cannot be considered a “proof” in any way comparable to the use of the term in
mathematics.  This creates a conundrum: While justices of the Supreme Court
are appointed for their skill in conventional legal reasoning, they are asked to
decide cases that defy resolution through the application of conventional legal
reasoning.  This raises the issue of what we should look for in a Supreme Court
justice: What kind of person do we want to decide what is legally true but
nonetheless unprovable?
Part III considers the phenomenon of the Roberts Court as “The Stepford
Justices”:  All of the justices have strikingly similar legal backgrounds.  The14
article posits that this homogeneity is a reaction to the ideological firestorm
created by Robert Bork’s failed nomination in 1987.  Post-Bork, both
Republican and Democratic presidents have tried to soft-pedal questions of
ideology by nominating candidates with “legal resumes on steroids.”  And the
result?  The 2006 Term produced one of the highest percentage of 5-4
decisions—and one of the lowest percentages of unanimous opinions—in
years.  Mere technical competence does not trump political ideology—nor
would any president want it to.  Obviously, an ideologically split Supreme
Court is nothing new.  What is new is both the numbing similarity—and the
alarming narrowness—of the professional backgrounds of the justices.
Part IV discusses why this homogeneity should disturb us.  Pretending that
a federal judge with an Ivy League degree is somehow above politics is
obviously a charade.  But this has resulted in a Supreme Court that, for the first
14. The reference, of course, is to the film The Stepford Wives, in which the married women
in a Connecticut suburb grow strangely similar.  See THE STEPFORD WIVES (Columbia Pictures
1975).  It was re-made by Paramount Pictures in 2004.  See John-Michael Maas, Marketing Gets
Wired, PUBLISHER’S WKLY., Apr. 26, 2004, at 18, 20.
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time in American history, lacks any member who has ever served in a legislature
on any level.  As for the executive branch, the Court lacks a single former
cabinet member.  Moreover, the Roberts Court—again, for the first time in
American history—lacks even one justice who ever ran as a candidate for any
public office.  This paucity of well-rounded governmental experience would be
worrisome on any collegial court, but it is especially so on the U.S. Supreme
Court. 
We must return to a tradition of choosing Supreme Court nominees with an
eye towards creating a healthy mix of justices with broad experience in all three
branches of government.
I. The Politics of Judging
It’s in the papers
It’s on your T.V. news
The application
It’s just a point of view
Well you know you can’t stop it
When they start to play
You gotta get out of the way
The politics of dancing
The politics of ooo feeling good
The politics of moving
Is this message understood?15
The judge must be “perfectly and completely independent, with
nothing to influence or contro[l] him but God and his conscience.”16
It is important for us . . . to strip down, like a runner, to eliminate
agendas [and] to eliminate ideologies . . . .17
 
15. RE-FLEX, The Politics of Dancing, on THE POLITICS OF DANCING (EMI Group 1983).
16. United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 569 (2001) (quoting John Marshall, Speech on
Dec. 11, 1829, in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-
30, at 616 (1830)).
17. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, 102d Cong., pt. 1, at 203 (1991) (statement of then-Judge Clarence
Thomas).
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I view the vote this morning as confirmation of what is for me a
bedrock principle—that judging is different from politics.18
So if we accept politics in dancing, why can’t we accept it on the Supreme
Court?
Some of this difficulty has to do with traditional notions of how justices work.
Richard Posner recently offered an iconoclastic take on this issue in his
Harvard Law Review Foreword on the Supreme Court’s 2004 Term.   His19
article is titled simply A Political Court.  His thesis is that to the extent the
Supreme Court is a constitutional court, it acts as a political body.  20
Posner begins by discussing two famous Harvard Law Review Forewords,
written by Henry Hart  and Erwin N. Griswold  respectively, on the work21 22
habits of the justices.  Hart focused on the effect of caseload on the work of the
individual justices.  He stated that “[w]riting opinions [is] the most time-
consuming of all judicial work, and the least susceptible of effective assistance
from a law clerk.”   Hart posited that the justices’ heavy caseload militated23
against their taking the time necessary to make wise decisions.24
Posner bluntly describes Hart’s views as “either naïve to the point of almost
total cluelessness, or intellectually dishonest.”   Posner disputes Hart’s25
contention that writing consumes much of the justices’ time, noting that even at
the time Hart wrote it was clear that law clerks carried the brunt of this work.  26
Posner ridicules Hart’s argument that more time per se would necessarily lead
to wiser decisions, describing Hart’s model of the Court as “a politically neutral
civil service guided by reason rather than by public opinion.”   Posner27
characterizes this as “the Progressive dream of policy emptied of politics.”28
18. CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 261 (2007) (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts after
his Supreme Court swearing-in ceremony).
19. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 32 (2005).  Material from this article is incorporated in RICHARD A. POSNER,
HOW JUDGES THINK 269-323 (2008).
20. Id. at 34.
21. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959).
22. Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term—Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes—
Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81 (1960).
23. Hart, supra note 21, at 91.
24. Id. at 99-101.
25. Posner, supra note 19, at 60. 
26. Id. at 60-61.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Id.
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Hart’s view was supported by Erwin Griswold, who served as both Solicitor
General of the United States and the Dean of Harvard Law School.   Griswold29
agreed with Hart that “[t]he volume of the work of the Court is staggering,” with
the justices “reading long records” and “writing reflective opinions.”   Posner30
concedes that this view “exemplifies an orthodoxy that Supreme Court Justices,
other judges, and not a few law professors continue to proclaim.”   Posner also31
calls it “even more naïve than Hart’s” views.32
Why?  Because there is no need for the justices to read much of the case
record; most of the opinion writing is farmed out to clerks; and the opinions
themselves are not “reflective” but rather “briefs in support of the decisions.”  33
So how does Posner characterize the work of the Court?  He describes the
docket as “dominated by cases in which the conventional sources of legal
authority, such as pellucid constitutional text or binding precedent . . . do not
speak in a clear voice.  If they did, the Court would rarely have to get involved
in the matter; it could leave it to the lower courts.”   Posner observes that “[t]he34
most striking characteristic of constitutional debate in the courts . . . is its
interminability.  Everything is always up for grabs intellectually, though not
politically.”   For this reason, 35
it is rarely possible to say with a straight face of a Supreme Court
constitutional decision that it was decided correctly or incorrectly. 
When one uses terms like “correct” or “incorrect” in this context, all
one can actually mean is that one likes (approves of, agrees with, or
is comfortable with) the decision in question or dislikes (disapproves
of, disagrees with, or is uncomfortable with) it.36
It is for this reason that Posner refers to the Supreme Court as “lawless.”  He
explains: “I use ‘lawless’ in a nonjudgmental though unavoidably provocative
sense.  I mean the word simply to denote an absence of tight constraints, an
ocean of discretion. . . . From a practical standpoint, constitutional adjudication
by the Supreme Court is also the exercise of discretion—and that is about all it
is.”  37
29. Dennis Hevesi, Erwin Griswold Is Dead at 90: Served as Solicitor General, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at B10.
30. Griswold, supra note 22, at 84.
31. Posner, supra note 19, at 62.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 42-43.
35. Id. at 41.
36. Id. at 40.
37. Id. at 41.
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So why can’t the nine justices sit down and reason together to reach the
correct result?  Posner states: “[R]easoned argument is ineffectual when the
arguers do not share common premises . . . .”   In fact, argument may actually38
“drive the antagonists further apart—or at least . . . cause them to dig in their
heels and clutch their beliefs closer to their chests.”   39
The conclusion a justice reaches may simply depend on the point where the
justice begins.  Posner provides some examples of these different starting
“premises”:
One disputant thinks the public safety more important than the rights
of people accused of crime; the other thinks the opposite. . . .  One
worries about subtle forms of sexual harassment; the other
(invariably male) worries about being falsely accused of harassment. 
One considers affirmative action naked discrimination; the other
considers it social justice and political necessity. . . . One views
abortion from the standpoint of the hapless fetus, the other from the
standpoint of a woman forbidden to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy.  One values the states as laboratories for social
experimentation; the other regards state government as provincial
and local governments as little better than village tyrannies.40
Judge Posner is hardly breaking new ground.  Consider this observation on
the nature of judging: “Judg[ment] begins . . . with a conclusion more or less
vaguely formed; a man ordinarily starts with such a conclusion and afterwards
tries to find premises which will substantiate it.”   The renowned legal41
philosopher Judge Jerome Frank said this in 1930.42
38. Id. at 73.
39. Id.
40. Id.  In his new book, Posner appears to favor the use of the terms “preconceptions” or
“Bayesian priors” rather than “premises.”  POSNER, supra note 19, at 67.
41. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108 (Peter Smith Publ’g, Inc. 1963)
(1930).  Jerome Frank was a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as well
as a key figure in the legal realism movement.  See David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats
and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the Law School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 121
& n.92 (2003).
42.  FRANK, supra note 41, at 108.  Similarly, Justice Samuel Miller in 1875 had this to say
about his colleagues on the Supreme Court:
It is vain to contend with judges who have been at the bar advocates for forty
years of railroad companies, and all the forms of associated capital, when they are
called upon to decide cases where such interests are in contest. . . .  All their
training, all their feelings are from the start in favor of those who need no such
influence.
Letter from Justice Samuel Miller to William Pitt Ballinger (Dec. 5, 1875), in MICHAEL A.
ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS 224 (2003) (emphasis added).
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The Hart-Griswold conception of judging visualizes a justice applying the
rules and tools of his craft to the raw materials before him—the facts of the
case—and then working inexorably to a conclusion devoid of political biases or
personal preferences.  It is a top-down process.  The Posner-Frank conception,
however, reverses the procedure.  It sees the judge as starting with the
conclusion and then using the rules and tools of his craft to convincingly support
it.  And personal preferences—or as Posner puts it, starting “premises”—are
inextricably tied to the conclusion reached.  The process cannot be divorced
from politics.
Stanley Fish has described judging in a manner similar to the Posner-Frank
position.  In his germinal article Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, he
offers his view on how theory is used by judges.   He begins by specifically43
defining what he means by “theory”:
I reserve that word for an abstract or algorithmic formulation that
guides or governs practice from a position outside any particular
conception of practice.  A theory, in short, is something a
practitioner consults when he wishes to perform correctly, with the
term “correctly” here understood as meaning independently of his
preconceptions, biases, or personal preferences.44
That is, theory is a mechanism by which decisions are generated.  It could very
well describe the Hart-Griswold conception of judging.
According to Fish, everything is wrong with this premise.  He contends that
no one in any practice—whether it is playing sports, analyzing sports, inventing,
or judging—“uses” theory in the sense of consciously following its rules in order
to achieve a result.  Fish is adamant on this point: “No activity is theoretical in
the strong sense of unfolding according to the dictates of a theory . . . .”45
This is not to say that theory is irrelevant.  Fish distinguishes between “using”
theory and “making use” of theory and cites Ronald Dworkin’s idea that law, in
order to be recognized as legitimate, must strive for “articulate consistency.”  46
In other words, a judge must be able to convince the legal community that her
ruling is not merely based on personal whim or caprice; instead, she must show
that the ruling is “the inevitable production of a principled and consistent
history.”   Thus, to convince the legal community of the legitimacy of her47
decision, a judge must be prepared to “make use” of theory.  In doing so, the
43. Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987).
44. Id. at 1779.
45. Id. at 1778.
46. Id. at 1778-79, 1786.
47. Id. at 1791.
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judge is engaging in the practice of self-presentation, that is, “the practice of
offering a persuasive account of why [she has] done what [she has] done.”48
Again, Fish contends that use of theory never actually leads a judge to a
conclusion.  Rather, the role of theory is to remind the judge that once she makes
her decision her work is only half-complete.  In order to be persuasive, the judge
must now use theory “to construct a certain kind of story in which [her] decision
is more or less dictated by the inexorable laws of the judicial process.”   If she49
skillfully uses theory to justify the decision she previously made, her decision
will be seen as one having “articulate consistency” that will then be accepted by
the legal community.50
The Posner-Fish view thus sees theory as a tool for justifying decisions that
have already been made rather than a tool used to actually make decisions.  But
is this the way judges—especially those who are justices on the Supreme
Court—really work?
Certainly some would agree.  Years ago, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
described work on the Supreme Court in this way: “At the constitutional level
where we work, ninety percent of any decision is emotional.  The rational part
of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections.”   According to51
Justice William O. Douglas, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone while writing
opinions would leave blanks after asserting legal points, with instructions that
his clerks should find precedents to support the contentions.   In the same vein,52
Laura Kalman’s biography of Abe Fortas relates a story from a former Fortas
clerk.  Fortas once dropped a draft opinion on the clerk’s desk with this curt
direction: “Decorate it.”   The clerk interpreted this to mean that he was to find53
case citations to support the legal conclusions Fortas had already reached.   (In54
discussing this story, Mark Tushnet observed that Fortas could treat legal
citations as decorations because Fortas’s grounding in legal realism at Yale
taught him “that—at least on the level at which he was working—cases were
available to support whatever legal propositions one put forth.” )55
Similarly, Justice Anthony Kennedy provided this description of how he
works: 
48. Id. at 1790 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 1793.
50. Id. at 1791.
51. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939-1975, at 8 (1980).
52. Id. at 171.
53. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 271-72 (1990).
54. Id. at 272.
55. Mark Tushnet, Members of the Warren Court in Judicial Biography: Themes in Warren
Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748, 756 (1995).  Justice Souter recently made the same
point when he wrote, “Of course, there is usually a case somewhere that provides comfort for
just about any claim.”  Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2606 (2007). 
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You know, all of us have an instinctive judgment that we make.  You
meet a person, you say, “I trust this person.  I don’t trust this
person.” . . . And judges do the same thing. . . .  But after you make
a judgment, you then must formulate the reason for your judgment
into a verbal phrase, into a verbal formula.  And then you have to see
if that makes sense, if it’s logical, if it’s fair, if it accords with the
law, if it accords with the Constitution, if it accords with your own
sense of ethics and morality.56
Hughes, Stone, Fortas, and Kennedy all, to varying degrees, seem to reflect
the Posner-Fish model of judging. 
Has any justice ever worked in the Hart-Griswold mode?  One possible
example is Justice Charles Evans Whittaker.
Whittaker served on the Court from 1957 to 1962.   His prior legal57
experience was in private practice in Kansas City, followed by short stints as a
judge on both the United States District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.58
Here is how his biographer Richard Lawrence Miller described Whittaker’s
work habits on the Supreme Court: 
Whittaker labored day and night . . . .
[H]e complained that justices had too much to do . . . .
. . . [But] having no judicial philosophy increased his toil. . . .
Whittaker’s colleagues [who had a judicial philosophy] might be
able to tell at a glance how a case should be decided, and assign their
clerks the task of finding rules and precedents supporting the
decision. . . .  [But Whittaker] examined facts of each case and
provisions of the Constitution mechanically, almost attempting to use
mathematical rules of formal logic to reach a decision. . . .
. . . He started from square one in every case rather than building
upon a foundation of knowledge. . . .
56. Interview by Academy of Achievement with Anthony Kennedy, Supreme Court Justice,
in New York City, N.Y. (June 3, 2005), transcript available at http://www.achievement.org/
autodoc/page/ken0int-1; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The Arrogance of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 16, 19 (quoting the Academy of
Achievement interview).
57. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 530 (Christopher
Tomlins ed., 2005).
58. Id.
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. . . [Whittaker] had good grasp of the law’s mechanics.  But he
was in the position of an expert automobile mechanic being asked to
design a road system.59
It should come as no surprise that during his tenure “[h]is opinion output was
annually the lowest on the Court.”60
Perhaps coincidentally, the Harvard Law Review Forewords written by Hart
and Griswold both appeared during Whittaker’s short stay on the Court.  It is
possible that Whittaker actually read these articles for guidance on how to
perform his job.  Is it just serendipity that both Whittaker and Hart complained
about the time constraints on a Supreme Court justice?  Could there be a
connection between Whittaker’s work habits and Hart’s and Griswold’s
descriptions of the work of a justice?
We will never know.  What we do know is that within a month of his
appointment Whittaker decided that he had made a mistake in taking the job.  61
Five years later, in the midst of trying to decide Baker v Carr,  Whittaker62
suffered a physical and mental collapse.   A family member found him ready63
to commit suicide.   Chief Justice Warren arranged for a team of doctors to64
examine Whittaker at Walter Reed Hospital.   When the doctors declared that65
further service on the Court would be fatal, Whittaker tendered his resignation.66
Consider Miller’s characterization that Whittaker “started from square one in
every case rather than building upon a foundation of knowledge.”   In Posner’s67
terms, Whittaker lacked starting “premises.”  Those justices who have starting
premises have natural inclinations towards results in constitutional cases.
And a recent study suggests that a justice’s starting premises affect more than
just constitutional decisions.   Ward Farnsworth compared decisions by68
Supreme Court justices in two kinds of criminal cases: those raising
59. RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, WHITTAKER: STRUGGLES OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
48-49 (2002) (emphasis added).
60. DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 311 (1998). 
Hutchinson chronicles the last days of Whittaker’s tenure before he was replaced by Byron
White.  Id. at 311-12.
61. MILLER, supra note 59, at 47.
62. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (recognizing principle of “one man, one vote”).  The United States
Reports tersely noted that Justice Whittaker did not participate in the decision of the case.  Id.
at 237. 
63. HUTCHINSON, supra note 60, at 311; MILLER, supra note 59, at 150-51.
64. MILLER, supra note 59, at 151.
65. HUTCHINSON, supra note 60, at 312; MILLER, supra note 59, at 151.
66. MILLER, supra note 59, at 151.
67. Id. at 48.
68. Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67 (2005).
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constitutional issues and those with non-constitutional issues, such as statutory
construction.   He posited that there should be no necessary connection between69
a judge’s decisions in these two types of cases.   Instead, he found an amazing70
congruence: Justices tended to be either pro-prosecution or pro-defense
regardless of the type of issue in the criminal case.   He credited this result to71
what he called a judge’s “priors.”  72
Last Term provided a good illustration of the Farnsworth thesis.  Eight of
the Court’s seventy-two opinions—11% of the entire Term’s  docket—
involved death penalty cases from state courts.   The cases came to the Court73
both through direct appeal and through federal habeas corpus.   The issues74
ranged from jury instructions  to competence of the defendant to be executed;75 76
from ineffective assistance of counsel  to improper removal of a juror;  one77 78




73. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (originating in Texas); Uttecht v.
Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007) (originating in Washington); Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct.
1933 (2007) (originating in Arizona); Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007) (originating in
Texas); Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706 (2007) (originating in Texas); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007) (originating in Texas); Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct.
1079 (2007) (originating in Florida); Ayers v. Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. 469 (2006) (originating in
California).
74. See Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (seeking federal habeas corpus relief); Brown, 127 S. Ct.
2218 (seeking federal habeas corpus relief); Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (seeking federal habeas
corpus relief); Smith, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (direct appeal of denial of state habeas corpus relief);
Brewer, 127 S. Ct. 1706 (seeking federal habeas corpus relief); Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. 1654
(seeking federal habeas corpus relief); Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (seeking federal habeas
corpus relief); Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. 469 (seeking federal habeas corpus relief).
75. Smith, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (holding state court used a constitutionally improper standard
of review in denying relief to capital offender based on instruction error); Brewer, 127 S. Ct.
1706 (holding that Texas death penalty instructions at penalty phase violated the Eighth
Amendment by not allowing proper jury consideration of evidence of Brewer’s mental illness
and substance abuse); Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (holding that Texas death penalty
instructions at penalty phase violated the Eighth Amendment by not allowing proper jury
consideration of evidence of defendant’s childhood deprivation and lack of self-control);
Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. 469 (holding that California jury instruction at penalty phase was
capacious enough to allow the jury to consider “forward-looking evidence”).
76. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (holding that in considering whether defendant was competent
to be executed, state court did not properly consider whether he had a rational understanding
of the state’s reasons for the execution).
77. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (holding that defendant received effective assistance of
counsel at penalty phase).
78. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (holding that juror was properly removed under principles of
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).
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case even dealt with whether the habeas petition had been timely filed.79
What did the cases have in common?  Every single case was decided 5-4. 
Every single case had Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito holding for the
prosecution.  Every single case had Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg
holding for the defense.  Every single case was decided by Justice Kennedy’s
vote—four times with the prosecution and four times with the defense. 
Farnsworth’s thesis certainly helps explain the votes of eight of the nine justices
in all eight death penalty cases.80
Farnsworth’s “priors,” Posner’s “premises,” Kennedy’s “instinctive
judgment,” Hughes’ “predilections”—are these all simply different ways of
suggesting that successful justices have always included politics in their judicial
judgments?
Return to the tragic figure of Justice Whittaker.  He was by all accounts a
competent federal judge on both the district court and court of appeals level. 
Did his refusal to recognize the acutely political dimension of the role of a
Supreme Court justice contribute to his failure in Washington? 
Look again at Miller’s criticism that Whittaker was “almost attempting to use
mathematical rules of formal logic to reach a decision.”   The next section will81
suggest an analogy to formal mathematics that may shed light on the true nature
of the Supreme Court docket. 
II. The Limits of Legal Logic: Kurt Gödel and the Work of the Supreme Court
The basic problem with the plurality’s technical “dicta”-based
response lies in its overly theoretical approach to case law . . . . Law
is not an exercise in mathematical logic.82
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.83
As a Supreme Court justice Charles Whittaker “exhausted himself
trying to find rules governing situations that would never have
reached the Supreme Court if existing rules had been adequate.”84
79. Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (holding that habeas corpus petition was untimely filed).
80. See Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842; Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218; Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933;
Smith, 127 S. Ct. 1686; Brewer, 127 S. Ct. 1706; Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. 1654;  Lawrence, 127
S. Ct. 1079; Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. 469.  For a more in-depth discussion of these cases, see
Timothy P. O’Neill, A STARK New Cabal on the Supreme Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug.
10, 2007, at 5.
81. MILLER, supra note 59, at 48. 
82. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2816
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
84. MILLER, supra note 59, at 51.
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In the early twentieth century, a mathematician named David Hilbert took on
an ambitious project.   His goal was to prove that all the axioms of arithmetic85
were both complete and consistent.  By “complete” he meant that each axiom
could be established through a formal proof.  By “consistent” he meant that all
the axioms taken together did not yield any logical contradictions.
There was a serious purpose behind Hilbert’s quest.  He was his generation’s
leading advocate of formalism in mathematics.  According to Hilbert,
mathematics was nothing more than “a game played according to certain simple
rules with meaningless marks on paper.”   Formalists contended that86
mathematicians did not “discover” truths.  Instead, in the words of Rebecca
Goldstein, formalists saw mathematicians as “simply in the business of
manipulating the mechanical rules of self-enclosed formal systems.”  87
Formalists believed that “man is the measure of all things.  [Man creates] formal
systems and all of mathematics follows.”88
Hilbert’s work attracted the attention of Kurt Gödel, the man Time magazine
would later recognize as the greatest mathematician of the century.   Contrary89
to Hilbert’s hope, Gödel proved that no formal system rich enough to contain
arithmetic can be both “consistent” and “complete.”  In any such formal system
of axioms there must be at least one axiom that is true but unprovable.90
85. REBECCA GOLDSTEIN, INCOMPLETENESS 121-45 (2005) (discussing David Hilbert).
86. Id. at 136.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 137.
89. Id. at 221 & n.4.
90. An in-depth discussion of how Gödel reached this conclusion is well beyond the scope
of this article.  But Rebecca Goldstein presents an excellent short description of Gödel’s proof. 
First, she says, assume a mathematical system; now assume the proposition “[t]his very
statement is not provable within this system.”  Id. at 166.  Let’s call this statement “G”.  Now
we can say “G is unprovable in the system.”  Id. at 167.  The negation of G would be “G is
provable in the system.”  Id.  Goldstein continues:
If G were provable then its negation—which, after all, says that G is
provable—would be true.  But if the negation of a proposition is true, then the
proposition itself is false.  So if G is provable then it is false.  But if G is provable,
then it is also true.  After all, what else does a proof show [?] . . .  So, . . . if G is
provable then it is both true and false—a contradiction—which means that G is
not provable.  Thus if the system is consistent, then G is not provable in it.  But
that is exactly what G says: that it isn’t provable.  So G is true.  Therefore, G is
both unprovable and true, which is precisely the famous conclusion of Gödel’s
proof, that there is a true but unprovable proposition expressible in the system if
the system is consistent. . . .  The formal system is either inconsistent or
incomplete. . . .  A system rich enough to contain arithmetic cannot be both
consistent and complete.
Id. at 166-68 (emphasis added).
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Legal scholars have previously written about the challenges and problems
involved in applying Gödel’s theorem to the study of law.   This article,91
however, only wishes to draw a very rough, broad analogy between Gödel’s
theorem and the work of the Supreme Court.
Drawing on the work of Mark R. Brown and Andrew C. Greenberg,  I92
contend that the very nature of the cases the Court accepts for review a fortiori
means that every decision of the Court could be characterized as “true but
unprovable.”  The Court chooses to review those cases that fall into the lacunae
between legal rules.  That is why lower courts have disagreed with each other
and that is why the Supreme Court is hearing the case.   I am using “true” not93
in any sophisticated philosophical sense, but rather in the pragmatic sense that
whatever five justices agree on becomes “true”—at least for the time being.  To
paraphrase Justice Robert Jackson, because the Court is the final arbiter, the
answer is not only “true” but “infallible.”94
But are we willing to call the Court’s opinion supporting the decision a
“proof” in a mathematical sense?  Of course not—especially when the “true” or
“correct” answer was reached by a 5-4 vote.  Recall Posner’s description of the
Supreme Court’s docket as being “dominated by cases in which the conventional
sources of legal authority, such as pellucid constitutional text or binding
precedent . . . do not speak in a clear voice.  If they did, the Court would rarely
have to get involved in the matter; it could leave it to the lower courts.”   Or95
recall again Richard Lawrence Miller’s account of Justice Whittaker futilely
“attempting to use mathematical rules of formal logic”  to reach decisions in96
cases that quite simply “would never have reached the Supreme Court if existing
rules had been adequate.”97
91. See, e.g., John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law from Self-
Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992); see also Mark R. Brown
& Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy
and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439, 1488 (1992).  Applied to
law, Gödel’s theorem illustrates that “the judiciary is . . . a true body politic.  ‘Decisions’ and
‘interpretations’ must rely on human choices and hunches—subjective determinations that
cannot be quantified.”  Id.
92. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 91, at 1488.
93. The U.S. Supreme Court does not exist merely to correct errors but rather to decide
issues that have created conflicts among lower courts.  Supreme Court Rule 10 states that the
Court will usually hear only those cases falling into three categories: 1) cases involving
jurisdictional conflicts as to the proper law; 2) cases departing from established law; and 3)
cases containing novel issues decided by lower courts.  SUP. CT. R. 10.
94. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).
95. Posner, supra note 19, at 42-43.
96. MILLER, supra note 59, at 48.
97. Id. at 51.
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Justice Breyer’s quotation that “[l]aw is not an exercise in mathematical
logic”  may seem uncontroversial enough to be considered banal.   Yet98 99
consider this New York Times interview with Professor Jack Greenberg of
Columbia Law School on his reaction to the Seattle School District  decision: 100
“Professor Greenberg suggested that more than law was at play in [the] decision. 
‘You can’t really say that five justices are so smart that they can read the law and
precedents and four others can’t,’ he said.  ‘Something else is going on.’”101
Professor Greenberg does not explain what that “something else” is that
constitutes something “more than law.”  But one does wonder if he felt the
presence of the same ominous, extra-legal “something else” in, for example, the
recent trio of 5-4 decisions that invalidated sentences of death in several capital
cases from Texas.102
Professor Greenberg’s contention that “more than law” was at play would be
correct if you just delete the “more than.”  It is simply law that is at play.  The
reason five justices can disagree with four justices is not because they are
flouting law, but because they are deciding cases that fall between the cracks of
established law.  As Justice Breyer reminds us, law is not simply an arid exercise
in mathematical logic.  As Judge Posner reminds us, the Supreme Court, after
all, is a “political court.”  And, as Gödel reminds us in a different context, not all
truths are necessarily provable.
The very same New York Times article brings this point into focus.  It notes
that Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion in Seattle School District cited parts
of the oral argument made on behalf of the black schoolchildren in Brown v.
Board of Education  in order to support his argument that the use of race by the103
98. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2816
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 50 n.10 (1961) (“[T]he
provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form;
they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil.” (quoting Gompers v. United
States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914)) (alteration in original)).
100. 127 S. Ct. 2738.
101. Adam Liptak, The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at
A24.
102. Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007) (holding state court used a constitutionally
improper standard of review in denying relief to capital offender based on instruction error);
Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706 (2007) (holding Texas death penalty instructions at
penalty phase violated the Eighth Amendment by not allowing proper jury consideration of
evidence of Brewer’s mental illness and substance abuse); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S.
Ct. 1654 (2007) (holding Texas death penalty instructions at penalty phase violated the Eighth
Amendment by not allowing proper jury consideration of evidence of defendant’s childhood
deprivation and lack of self-control).
103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
718 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:701
Seattle and Louisville school systems was unconstitutional.   Robert L. Carter,104
in his argument before the Court the first time Brown was heard in 1952,
contended that “no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational
opportunities among its citizens.”   And, Roberts’ plurality opinion noted,105
“[t]here is no ambiguity in that statement.”   The Court went on to void the106
Seattle and Louisville integration schemes.
The New York Times then interviewed Robert Carter, now a ninety-year-old
senior federal judge, who said that the plurality had completely misinterpreted
his words.  “All that race was used for [in 1952] was to deny equal opportunity
to black people,” Judge Carter said.   “It’s to stand that argument on its head107
to use race the way [the justices in the Seattle School District plurality] use [it]
now.”108
So what is it—do we look at the words in isolation (the plurality’s view) or
the words in context (the dissenters’ view)?  This most basic of legal
disagreements is the reason Seattle School District found its way to the Supreme
Court.109
Many, including this author, feel very strongly that one side in the Seattle
School District case was right and the other side was wrong.  Nevertheless, I
cannot pretend that I can “prove” my view in the sense that one can prove the
Pythagorean Theorem.  Indeed, Justice Breyer in effect says “Don’t even try”;
law is not a mathematical proof.110
I probably could not even “prove” my position in the weaker, legal sense of
applying traditional legal methodology to the existing case law to convince all
104. Liptak, supra note 101, at A24.
105. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. at 2767-68 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7,
Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10)). 
106. Id. at 2768.
107. Liptak, supra note 101, at A24.
108. Id.
109. This issue of how to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment goes back to the
Amendment’s ratification in 1868.  Early on, whites and corporations argued that they could
claim protection under the “color-blind” reading of the language, while African-Americans
countered that the Fourteenth Amendment must be read in the context of slavery and
Reconstruction.  The victory of the former reading has been characterized as a victory for “The
Inverted Constitution.”  For an excellent analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment in the decades following ratification, see JACK BEATTY, AGE OF
BETRAYAL 109-91 (2007).  See also Nicholas Lemann, Reversals, NEW YORKER, July 30, 2007,
at 28 (“That more than a century of litigation on race has centered on the meaning of [the Equal
Protection Clause] should be taken as a sign that the passage doesn’t, and wasn’t intended to,
contain a clear and perpetually useful instruction on how the country should conduct its affairs
on racial matters.”).
110. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. at 2816 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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readers that I had reached the correct result.  Indeed, the plurality attempted such
an approach through elaborate parsing of prior cases into holdings and dicta.  111
This effort was met by Justice Breyer’s withering critique: “The basic problem
with the plurality’s technical ‘dicta’-based response lies in its overly theoretical
approach to case law, an approach that emphasizes rigid distinctions between
holdings and dicta in a way that serves to mask the radical nature of today’s
decision.”112
Neither logic nor legal technique explain why the plurality views the
command of the Equal Protection Clause as a categorical bar to a state using
racial considerations, while the dissenters contend that the language must be
viewed in the context of what the state is trying to accomplish in the area of race
relations.
After the dust settles following the 185-page shoot-out called the Seattle
School District case, Judge Posner’s article from three years ago still offers the
simplest and most concise reason for the 5-4 divide: justices have different
starting “premises.”  More specifically, in Posner’s words: “One considers
affirmative action naked discrimination; the other considers it social justice and
political necessity.”   Where justices begin often dictates where they will end. 113
In the final analysis, the rest is mostly noise.
Possibly the 2006 Term’s best example of the role of starting premises in
Supreme Court decision-making can be found in Bowles v Russell.   The facts114
are simple.  Bowles’s request for relief under federal habeas corpus was
denied.   He then failed to file a timely notice of appeal.   Consequently,115 116
Bowles proceeded to ask the District Judge to extend the period for filing the
notice of appeal, relying on a federal rule that allows the judge under certain
conditions to extend the filing period fourteen days.   The judge granted the117
motion, but the judge’s written order inexplicably gave Bowles seventeen days
instead of fourteen; neither the judge nor the parties noticed the error.   Bowles118
filed later than the rule’s fourteen days, but within the seventeen days granted in
the District Judge’s order.   Later, the Government filed a motion to dismiss the119
appeal, alleging that the filing was untimely.  120
111. Id. at 2746-68 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 2816 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
113. Posner, supra note 19, at 73. 
114. 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
115. Id. at 2362.
116. Id.
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The issue before the Court was simple.  Should Bowles have been able to rely
on the seventeen day period written in black-and-white in the judge’s order, or
does the fourteen day rule—written in black-and-white in the rule book—trump
the judge’s mistake?
Bowles is more than merely a Supreme Court case.  It could function as a
personality quiz for the general public.  Bowles divides the world into two
groups—those who unfailingly enforce rules and those who are willing to listen
to an excuse for a rule violation after the violation has occurred.
Bowles was easy to predict.  Forget about law.  The only issue was “What
kind of high school teacher would each justice have been?”  Weeks before the
decision was released, I counted five justices who could have been teachers at
my Roman Catholic high school: Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and
Alito.   In fact, my school’s Classics Department could have been comprised121
of these five.
What, miss a deadline on your Aeneid report and then expect Mr. Scalia to
listen to your excuse?  Or Mr. Alito?  Or any of the five?  No way.  Rules are
rules.  “You have a problem, Mr. O’Neill?  Did you even read the school rule? 
Forget what you thought I meant.  Next time come to me before the due date in
the school rule.  Now sit down.”
Sure, crusty but kindly Mr. Stevens would understand.  And Mr. Souter
would also come through.  (“I hear he lets you call him Dave in class!”)  But
even with Mr. Breyer and Ms. (“That’s Ms., not Mrs.”) Ginsburg on your side,
that’s only four.
It is not difficult to predict who won in Bowles and how the Court split. (Hint:
It was 5-4).
Go back to Gödel’s theorem holding that within any formal system there will
always be truths that are unprovable.  How, one may ask, did Gödel explain how
a person could determine something was “true” without being able to “prove”
it?  For Gödel, this is where “intuitions” came into play.  Intuitions “are given
to us by the nature of things; . . . intuition is seen as the a priori analogue to
sense perception, a direct form of apprehension.”122
121. And, indeed, all five are Roman Catholics.  See Robert F. Drinan, Catholics on the
Supreme Court: The Jury Is Out on Chief Justice John Roberts, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP., Sept.
8, 2006, at 15.
122. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 85, at 134.  A character in a Tom Stoppard play offered this
distinction between reason and intuition: “[I]f the question is, how should we live? . . . then
reason gives no answer or different answers.  So something is wrong.  The divine spark in man
is not reason after all, but something else, some kind of intuition or vision, perhaps like the
moment of inspiration experienced by the artist . . . .”  TOM STOPPARD, VOYAGE: THE COAST
OF UTOPIA 36 (2002) (omissions in original).  For an extended analysis of the uses and misuses
of intuition, see DAVID G. MYERS, INTUITION (2002).
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There were those who looked at Gödel’s theorem and despaired that man
could not create a formal system that is both complete and consistent.  Others,
on the contrary, were exhilarated by the idea that no formal system could ever
be devised to include everything man could intuit and know.  Gödel’s theorem
meant that man was much more than merely a reasoning machine; it is intuition
that differentiates the human mind from a calculator.
Again, let us be clear.  Gödel and the Supreme Court are dealing with very
different concepts of “truth.”  The truth that Gödel pursued was for him a
Platonic reality, while the truth on the Supreme Court is pretty much whatever
five justices will agree on in a given case. 
Just as Gödel posited that any formal system will have truths that cannot be
proven, analogously the Supreme Court docket is made up almost entirely of
cases where the traditional tools of legal reasoning cannot produce a conclusive
answer; that is the reason the Supreme Court agreed to decide them in the first
place.  And just as Gödel looked to intuition when traditional tools of logic failed
in mathematics, so too must Supreme Court justices look to “premises” or
“priors” or “predilections” to go where conventional legal reasoning alone will
not take them. 
Justices on the Supreme Court face a conundrum.  It is assumed that they are
very skilled in the use of traditional legal analysis to decide cases.  The paradox
is that the cases selected for the Supreme Court’s docket a fortiori, in the words
of Judge Posner, “occupy a broad open area where the conventional legal
materials of decision run out and the Justices, deprived of those crutches, have
to make a discretionary call.”   Posner refers to the kinds of decisions Supreme123
Court justices have to make as “political” because the cases are “not susceptible
of confident evaluation on the basis of professional legal norms.”   Supreme124
Court justices are often taken from the ranks of the nation’s leading federal and
state judges—experts in the use of conventional legal reasoning.  They are then
asked to decide cases which almost invariably exist in a “broad open area where
the conventional legal materials of decision run out.”   As earlier noted,125
Richard Lawrence Miller described Justice Whittaker’s problem of moving from
a federal trial and appellate judge to a Supreme Court justice as analogous to “an
expert automobile mechanic being asked to design a road system.”  126
The problem may not be Justice Whittaker’s alone.  Potential justices now
must be legal technicians with rigorous academic backgrounds and prior judicial
experience.  Yet these qualities may not be the only characteristics required to
decide what is legally true but nonetheless unprovable.
123. Posner, supra note 19, at 40.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. MILLER, supra note 59, at 49.
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III.  The Roberts Court Is a “Judges’ Court” . . . And Why We Should Be
Concerned
The current system of nominating and confirming Supreme Court justices has
resulted in a group of nine individuals with extraordinarily homogeneous legal
backgrounds.  For the first time in the nation’s history, every single justice on the
current Supreme Court had been a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals at the
time of appointment.  127
And the selection pool is even narrower than it sounds.  Although there are
thirteen circuit courts,  all nine members of the Roberts court have come from128
only five circuits: District of Columbia,  First,  Third,  Seventh,  and129 130 131 132
Ninth.   Indeed, six of the nine justices were drawn from only two of those133
circuits: the District of Columbia and the First.
This is unprecedented. 
Additionally, seven of the nine members of the Roberts Court graduated from
only two law schools:  Harvard  and Yale.134 135 136
This is also unprecedented.
And this has not gone unnoticed. 
Last February, Chief Justice Roberts spoke at Northwestern Law School. 
Roberts himself mentioned that all nine justices had come directly from
judgeships on the U.S. Court of Appeals.  A newspaper account of the speech
said that: 
127. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
128. First through Eleventh Circuits, District of Columbia Circuit, and Federal Circuit.  Prior
judicial experience of the justices can be found on the Supreme Court’s website.  The Justices
of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2008).
129. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg.  See A Divided
Group, supra note 8; Bush Chooses Roberts, supra note 8; Oyez, Roberts Court (2006-), supra
note 8. 
130. Justices Souter and Breyer.  See A Divided Group, supra note 8.
131. Justice Alito.  See Kirkpatrick, supra note 8. 
132. Justice Stevens.  See A Divided Group, supra note 8.
133. Justice Kennedy.  Id.
134. Currently, the American Bar Association has approved 196 law schools in the United
States.  See ABA Approved Law Schools, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/
approved.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
135. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer.  See A Divided
Group, supra note 8; Bush Chooses Roberts, supra note 8.
136. Justices Alito and Thomas.  See A Divided Group, supra note 8; Kirkpatrick, supra note
8.
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[T]he justices’ common experience of serving on the federal
appellate bench suggests that the Supreme Court is more of a
“judges’ court” now than in the past, Roberts said.
And he said he was pleased with that turn of events.
"To the extent that reflects the perception that what the court
ought to be doing is acting like judges rather than acting like
statesmen, I think that’s a healthy development,” Roberts said.
“Because I think the court should be a court of law and not a place
where policy is formed.”137
Putting aside whether the Roberts Court in the 2006 Term acted like judges,
statesmen, or neither, one must examine how we have reached a point where
every justice has come from exactly the same job and seven out of nine
graduated from the same two Ivy League law schools.
Why do we have “The Stepford Justices”?
The origin of this homogeneous Court is the Robert Bork debacle in 1987. 
There is no question that the ideological firestorm ignited by his nomination to
the Supreme Court and his rejection by the Senate had an impact on the
nominations that followed.  A successful Bork nomination may very well have
opened the door for others like him—bright conservatives who had also been
appointed to judgeships on the U.S. Court of Appeals by Ronald Reagan.  Other
than Bork on the D.C. Circuit, conservatives could have looked to Harvie
Wilkinson on the Fourth Circuit, Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook on the
Seventh Circuit, and Alex Kozinski on the Ninth Circuit. 
With Bork’s defeat, however, caution became the watchword.  Presidents
Reagan and Bush turned to the bland Anthony Kennedy; David “The Stealth
Candidate” Souter;  and Clarence (“Shed the Baggage of Ideology”)138
Thomas.   The Kennedy and Souter nominations attracted little serious139
opposition.   And the rancor surrounding the Thomas nomination had a lot140
137. Patricia Manson, Roberts Says He Presides Over “Judges’ Court”, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Feb. 2, 2007, at 1.
138. At the time of Souter’s nomination, the press dubbed him “The Stealth Candidate”
because of his lack of an ideological paper trail.  See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, DAVID HACKETT
SOUTER: TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN ON THE REHNQUIST COURT 94-146 (2005).  (Chapter 3 is
actually entitled “Stealth Candidate.”)  Of course, considering Souter’s record since he has
joined the Supreme Court, the most surprised person may have been President George H.W.
Bush.  Bush, concerned by Souter’s lack of a written policy record, relied on New Hampshire
Senator Warren Rudman’s personal assurance that Souter was “one of the most extraordinary
human beings [he’d] ever known.”  Id. at 100.  In light of the more extensive paper trails of the
five justices named to the Court after Souter, presidents appear to have learned a lesson. 
139. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
140. Kennedy was unanimously confirmed in 1988.  Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 97 to 0,
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more to do with Anita Hill’s allegations than with serious discussions of
ideology.  141
Notably, these successful nominations had the following in common: The
three men were all judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals and all three graduated
from either Harvard or Yale Law School.   Ideology was being soft-pedaled in142
favor of alleged technical competence.
President Clinton did not change the pattern.  He nominated Stephen Breyer
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, two more Ivy League law school graduates who were
judges on the U.S Court of Appeals.   President Bush has followed with yet143
two more Ivy League judges from the same court, John Roberts and Samuel
Alito.144
The post-Bork strategy followed by both the Republicans and the Democrats
is obvious: hype credentials, not ideology.  Bring in nominees with legal
resumes on steroids.  Take only judges from the second-highest federal court. 
Pile on the Ivy League degrees.  Have the nominee say—with a straight
face—that he is willing to decide cases unburdened by ideology, and then hope
that no one will pay any attention to the “man behind the curtain.”  145
So now for the first time in American history we have a Supreme Court in
which every justice came directly from the U.S. Court of Appeals.  In Chief
Justice Roberts’ words, we have a “judges’ court,” a “court of law” rather than
“a place where policy is formed.”146
Confirms Kennedy to High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1988, at A18.  Souter was confirmed 90-
9. YARBROUGH, supra note 138, at 143-44.
141. See, e.g., JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE (1994); KEVIN MERIDA
& MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT (2007).
142. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
143. President Clinton tried to find a Supreme Court nominee from outside the federal
judiciary.  He told his aides he wanted a person with a “big heart” rather than the kind of 
professional jurist he pejoratively referred to as one of the “footnote people.”  Yet for various
reasons, his attempts to recruit people such as Mario Cuomo, George Mitchell, and Bruce
Babbitt all failed.  See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 62-81 (2007). 
144. Bush tried to nominate Harriet Miers, a person with very different credentials.  See infra
text accompanying notes 198-204 (discussing problems with the Miers nomination).
145. See THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro Goldwyn Mayer 1939) (Professor Marvel a.k.a. The
Wizard of Oz).  In fact, the insistent demand for “More federal appellate judges!!!” and “More
Ivy League degrees!!!” is reminiscent of Christopher Walken’s classic portrayal of record
producer Bruce Dickinson on Saturday Night Live in 2000.  The skit, which parodied Blue
Oyster Cult’s recording session for “(Don’t Fear) The Reaper,” has producer Walken/Dickinson
offering exactly the same advice to the musicians after every take: “More cowbell!!!”  Saturday
Night Live (NBC television broadcast Apr. 8, 2000).  The video of the skit can be found on
numerous websites.  See, e.g., SNL More Cowbell, http://www.funnyhub.com/videos/pages/
snl-more-cowbell.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
146. See Manson, supra note 137.
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Opinions on whether this is accurate will vary from observer to observer. 
But, as Adam Cohen has pointed out, the Roberts Court during the 2006 Term
was certainly not shy about telling other government branches and agencies how
to do their jobs.   It told Congress that a key part of the McCain-Feingold147
campaign finance law was unconstitutional;  it told the Equal Employment148
Opportunity Commission that the way it judged the timeliness of complaints in
pay discrimination cases was wrong;  it told Seattle and Louisville that they149
were improperly using race in their assignments to public schools.   The Court150
also overturned its own precedents, such as a ninety-six-year-old decision that
forbade vertical price-fixing agreements,  and all but overruled a case it151
decided in 2000 when it upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.152
What Cohen found ironic was that President Bush had tirelessly campaigned
against “activist judges,” and that he “promised to nominate [only those] judges
who would ‘interpret the law, not try to make law.’”   Cohen concludes that by153
this definition, the Roberts Court’s 2006 Term was one of the most “activist”
Courts in recent memory.154
Where one observer sees judicial activism backed only by raw judicial power,
others see a court enforcing law through reason and restraint.
One example of the difference between “power” and “reason” occurred in
1991.  The Court in Payne v. Tennessee  held that “victim impact” testimony155
was admissible at the punishment stage of death penalty trials.  Payne overruled
two recent decisions that had held exactly the opposite.156
Why the sudden change-of-heart?
Stripped of the legal mumbo-jumbo, the bottom-line was that Justices Souter
and Kennedy had replaced Justices William Brennan and Lewis Powell,
respectively.  Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissent in Payne did not miss this
point.  In his eloquent dissent—which would be the last opinion of his
career—he equated the Court’s change of mind with its change in personnel and 
147. Adam Cohen, Editorial, Last Term’s Winner at the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A16.
148. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
149. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
150. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
151. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
152. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).  The 2000 case ruling Nebraska’s partial-
birth abortion law unconstitutional was Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
153. Cohen, supra note 147, at A16.
154. Id.
155. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
156. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808;
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
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noted that “[p]ower, not reason, is the new currency of this Court’s
decisionmaking.”157
The Warren Court was also accused of putting power before reason.  In
another eloquent dissent, Justice John M. Harlan railed against the Warren Court
for overruling a Vinson Court precedent that was only twelve years old.  Harlan
criticized the majority for speaking “only [with] a voice of power, not of
reason.”   The case?  Mapp v. Ohio, in which the Warren Court found the158
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule binding on the states, thus overruling the
Vinson Court’s recent holding in Wolf v. Colorado.159
Clearly, what is “power” and what is “reason” lies very much in the eye of the
beholder, making Adam Cohen’s conclusion in his New York Times article even
more interesting.  After scoring the Roberts Court for its “conservative judicial
activism,” Cohen then states:  “It is time to admit that all judges are activists for
their vision of the law.  Once that is done, the focus can shift to where it should
be: on whose vision is more faithful to the Constitution, and better for the
nation.”160
What makes this view so refreshing is that it suggests we stop pretending that
federal appellate judges with Ivy League degrees somehow comprise a Mandarin
class of civil servants without “priors,”  “predilections,”  or “premises.”161 162 163
Perhaps we can finally return to an American tradition that has all but
disappeared: Supreme Court justices with wide-ranging governmental
experience outside the judicial branch.
IV. Beyond a “Judges’ Court”: The Need for Experiential Diversity on the
U.S. Supreme Court
So what has the “judges’ court” so prized by Chief Justice Roberts produced?
The 2006 Term had the highest number of 5-4 decisions and the second
lowest number of unanimous decisions in a decade.   The problem is not what164
the justices are saying but rather who the justices are.
157. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 686 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  The source of Justice
Harlan’s rancor was his contention that the exclusionary rule issue had not been raised by Mapp
and was not properly before the Court.  See SAMUEL DASH, THE INTRUDERS 96-98 (2004);
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1983). 
159. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
160. Cohen, supra note 147 (emphasis added).
161. Farnsworth, supra note 68, at 73.
162. DOUGLAS, supra note 51, at 8.
163. Posner, supra note 19, at 73.
164. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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Consider this fact:  The 2006 Term is the first time in American history that
no justice of the U.S. Supreme Court has ever previously served as a legislator
at the federal, state, or local level.  165
And consider this:  The 2006 Term is the first time in American history that
no justice of the U.S. Supreme Court has ever run for public office of any kind.166
As discussed in Part III, this post-Bork quest to create the illusion of
competence without ideology—manifested by selecting only federal appellate
judges with Ivy League backgrounds—has obviously done nothing to heal the
ideological fissures on the Court.   What it has done, however, is create a U.S.167
Supreme Court possessing one of the narrowest ranges of governmental
experience in the history of the Supreme Court.
In a nutshell, we now have eight justices who know the words to the Harvard
or Yale fight songs, but not one who has ever introduced a bill in a legislature
or has been a candidate for public office.   Again, this narrowness is168
unprecedented.
To get the full sense of the enormous change we have witnessed in the
composition of the Court, it is helpful to take a “snapshot” of the members of the
165. Working backwards, we can see that—until today—there has always been at least one
member of the Supreme Court with experience in the legislative branch: Sandra Day O’Connor
(Arizona state senator) (Supreme Court service: 1981-2006); Potter Stewart (Cincinnati City
Councilman) (1958-1981); Hugo Black (U.S. Senate) (1937-1971); George Sutherland (U.S.
House of Representatives) (1922-1938); Joseph McKenna (U.S. House of Representatives)
(1898-1925); Melville W. Fuller (Illinois House of Representatives) (1888-1910); Stephen J.
Field (California Assembly) (1863-1897); James M. Wayne (U.S. House of Representatives)
(1835-1867); John Marshall (U.S. House of Representatives) (1801-1835); William Paterson
(New Jersey Senate) (1793-1806); John Jay (Continental Congress) (1789-1795).  See Cornell
Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Information Institute: Biographies of the Supreme Court Justices,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/histBio.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) [hereinafter
Biographies of the Justices] (listing biographical information of all Supreme Court justices up
to and including Justice Breyer).  And the concept of “legislating” in the broad sense is not
totally divorced from the work of a judge. Consider Oliver Wendell Holmes’ observation that
“I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate.” S. Pac. Co. v Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). And Richard Posner has referred to appellate
judges as “occasional legislators.” POSNER, supra note 19, at 81.
166. See Oyez: Justices by Court, supra note 10.  It is true that Souter served as New
Hampshire Attorney General from 1976-1978.  But at that time the attorney general was
appointed by the governor.  See YARBROUGH, supra note 138, at 20.
167. See supra Part III.
168. Five justices are graduates of Harvard Law School: Roberts, Breyer, Souter, Kennedy,
and Scalia.  See supra note 135 and accompanying text.  Two justices are graduates of Yale
Law School: Alito and Thomas.  See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  And Ginsburg
attended Harvard Law School before transferring to Columbia Law School.  See supra note 12
and accompanying text.  None of the current justices has ever served as a legislator or run for
any other public office.  See supra notes 10-11, 165-66.
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Court over the last six decades, starting in 2006, using only one criterion to
identify each justice: the job the justice held at the time of appointment to the
Supreme Court.  It is not a perfect measure.  For example, even though
Thurgood Marshall and John M. Harlan spent most of their careers as practicing
lawyers, I count them as U.S. Court of Appeals judges because that was their job
when they were appointed to the Supreme Court.
Here are the results.
In 2006, all nine justices had been judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals.  169
In 1996, seven had been judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals.   Justice170
O’Connor had been a state judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals.   Chief171
Justice Rehnquist came from the Office of Legal Counsel and had never been a
judge.172
In 1986, only four of the justices came from the U.S. Court of Appeals.  173
Two had been state court judges (Justices O’Connor and Brennan).   Three had174
never been judges: one was Rehnquist; one was Lewis Powell, who came from
private practice; the third was Byron White, who had been U.S. Deputy Attorney
General.175
In 1976, five of the justices came from the U.S. Court of Appeals.   One176
came from a state court (Brennan).   The same three had never been judges177
(Rehnquist, Powell, and White).178
In 1966, only two justices had come from the U.S. Court of Appeals.  179
Brennan came from a state court.   But the remaining six had not been judges180
169. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
170. See Oyez: Rehnquist Court (1994-2005), http://www.oyez.org/courts/rehnquist/rehn6/




173. See Oyez: Rehnquist Court (1986-1987), http://www.oyez.org/courts/rehnquist/rehn1/




176. See Oyez: Burger Court (1975-1981), http://www.oyez.org/courts/burger/burg4/ (last




179. See Oyez: Warren Court (1965-1967), http://www.oyez.org/courts/warren/war8/ (last
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at the time they were appointed to the Supreme Court.   Two came directly181
from the U.S. Department of Justice (White and Tom Clark).   One came from182
the Securities and Exchange Commission (William Douglas).   Two came from183
electoral politics: Earl Warren was Governor of California and Hugo Black was
U.S. Senator from Alabama.   One came straight from private practice (Abe184
Fortas).185
In 1956, only one justice had been appointed directly from the U.S. Court of
Appeals: John M. Harlan.   The only state court judge was Brennan.   Seven186 187
of the justices had not been judges at the time they were appointed to the
Supreme Court.   Three of them came from positions in the federal188
government: Douglas, Clark, and Stanley Reed, who had been Solicitor
General.   Three came from electoral politics: Warren; Black; and Harold189
Burton, U.S. senator from Ohio.   One came directly from academics: Felix190
Frankfurter.191
In 1946, again only one justice came directly from the U.S. Court of Appeals:
Wiley Rutledge.   Eight of the justices had not been judges at the time they192
were appointed to the Supreme Court.   Five came from positions in the federal193






186. See Oyez: Warren Court (1956-1957), http://www.oyez.org/courts/warren/war3/ (last
visited Mar. 19, 2008) (listing biographical information of the justices on the Warren Court in
1956).  It should be noted that Harlan had spent most of his career in private practice.  He had
only been a judge on the Second Circuit for less than one year when he was appointed to the
Supreme Court.  See Oyez: Biography of John M. Harlan, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, http://
www.oyez.org/justices/john_m_harlan2/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 





192. See Oyez: Stone Court (1945-1946), http://www.oyez.org/courts/stone/sto5/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2008) (listing biographical information of the justices on the Stone Court in 1946).
193. Id.
194. However, before he was Secretary of the Treasury, Vinson had served as a judge on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  See Oyez: Biography of Fred M. Vinson, U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice, http://www.oyez.org/justices/fred_m_vinson/ (last visited Mar.
19, 2008).
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Attorney Generals (Frank Murphy and Robert Jackson).   Two came from195
electoral politics: Black and Burton.  Frankfurter came from academics.  196
To summarize: in 1946, only one justice on the Court had been a judge of any
kind at the time of appointment.  Yet in 2006, not only all the justices had been
judges at the time of appointment, but they were all from the same court: the
U.S. Court of Appeals.
As previously discussed, the difference is the result of a tactic used by both
Republican and Democratic presidents over the past twenty years: emphasizing
a narrow concept of professional competence—federal appellate judicial
experience and Ivy League degrees—as a way of downplaying ideology.197
But a related phenomenon also contributes to the difference: the rise of
“gavel-to-gavel” television coverage of Supreme Court confirmation hearings
before the Senate Judiciary Committee.  What used to be done informally behind
closed doors has now become “must-see TV,” something along the lines of Are
You Smarter Than a Fifth-Term Senator?
Jan Crawford Greenburg writes how the realities of the modern Senate
confirmation hearing helped torpedo the Harriet Miers nomination:
Miers, though a smart and capable lawyer, had no experience in
constitutional law. . . . [S]he had little understanding of the complex
constitutional topics the senators would want to discuss in her
upcoming hearings.  And the confirmation process had changed . . . .
The hearings were so contentious and the questions so focused that
nominees without a background in constitutional law—either an
experienced judge or a [regular member of the Supreme Court
Bar]—would have a very tough time of it.  Gone were the days when
a president could nominate a practicing lawyer like Lewis Powell or
Byron White and watch him sail through.198
So, one may wonder, what was Byron White’s 1962 confirmation hearing
like?  According to White’s biographer, Dennis Hutchinson, “[t]he gravity of the
hearings was evidenced by the fact that chairman [Senator] Eastland attended for
only five minutes.”   Attorney General Robert Kennedy was so concerned that199
he sent his wife Ethel in his place.   The hearing lasted a total of ninety200
minutes.   “After a five-minute executive session, the committee unanimously201
195. See Oyez: Stone Court (1945-1946), supra note 192.
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
198. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 279 (2007).
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approved White’s nomination.”   The nomination then moved to the Senate202
floor that same afternoon, where White was confirmed by voice vote.203
In contrast, consider Greenburg’s comments about the confirmation process
as it exists today:
Senators expect a discussion of complex constitutional issues, and
[consequently] a nominee who’s spent his career thinking about
constitutional law, either as a judge or a top appellate lawyer, starts
with an enormous edge.
Lawyers like Miers . . . are expected to do the impossible.  At one
time, there was a place on the Supreme Court for lawyers like Miers,
those with practical experience who handled witness interviews and
managed law firms and ran bar associations.  Lewis Powell was one
before President Nixon nominated him.  But those days are gone. 
The job interview is designed for the appeals court judge or the elite
appellate lawyer—someone like a Roberts or an Alito.204
But isn’t it important to separate intellectual heavyweights such as Samuel
Alito from untested contenders such as Harriet Miers?  The fear is that a
nominee lacking the intellectual credentials of an Alito could not stand up to a
strong personality such as Chief Justice Roberts.  Do we really want a judicial
novice such as Miers to simply agree by default with the Chief Justice 90% of
the time?
Of course not.  So instead, during the 2006 Term we had Samuel Alito
agreeing with Roberts in 94% of the cases.205
I want to be clear.  My proposal to increase the scope of prior governmental
experience in our Supreme Court nominees has nothing to do with trying to
change ideologies.  Ideologically, the judicial decisions of a former SEC
Chairman such as William Douglas can be just as predictable as the judicial
decisions of a Samuel Alito.  And Bill Clinton would no more appoint an
Antonin Scalia than would Ronald Reagan appoint Ruth Bader Ginsburg.206
202. Id. at 331.
203. Id.
204. GREENBURG, supra note 198, at 302 (emphasis added).
205. SCOTUSblog.com, supra note 4, at 3.  The 94% includes cases where Alito and
Roberts agreed in part, as well as those in which they agreed in judgment only.  Id.
206. A president’s use of party ideology to choose a Supreme Court nominee is a tradition
that goes back to the nation’s founding.  In fact, it was not until Republican Abraham Lincoln’s
nomination of Democrat Stephen Field in 1863 that a president openly crossed party lines to
make a Supreme Court nomination—and at that time the deepest national ideological divide was
Unionist/Secessionist rather than Republican/Democrat.  (Although President John Tyler
nominated members of both political parties to the Supreme Court in 1844-45, he did so at a
time when he himself was unclear about his own party affiliation.)  AKHIL REED AMAR,
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Given the ideological proclivities of presidents and their nominees, I am
looking for something far more modest: prior governmental experience outside
of the judicial branch.  And the reasons are two-fold.  First, past work in a non-
judicial branch of government may occasionally result in something other than
an ideologically predictable result from a justice in a particular case.  Second,
extra-judicial experience often is accompanied by personality traits vital to the
workings of a collegial Court. 
First, an example of the former.  
In 1987, the Court decided Illinois v. Krull.   The issue was straightforward. 207
Three years before, the Court had held that even if a search warrant lacked
probable cause, the evidence would nonetheless be admissible at a criminal trial
if the court could find that the police who obtained the warrant had reasonably
relied on the magistrate’s decision that the warrant was proper.   This was the208
first time the Court had recognized a so-called “good faith” exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.209
In Krull, police officers relied on an Illinois statute that authorized warrantless
searches of the records of licensed motor vehicle and vehicular parts sellers.  210
The statute was later found to be unconstitutional.   The issue was whether211
evidence seized pursuant to police searches that had been carried out before the
statute was found unconstitutional would nevertheless be admissible at a
criminal trial.   In other words, would the Court recognize a police officer’s212
good faith reliance on a statute in the same way that Leon recognized good faith
reliance on a magistrate’s decision?
Krull extended the good faith exception to such cases.   Unsurprisingly, the213
justices simply repeated either the pro-government or pro-defense votes they had
cast in Leon —with one exception.  Justice O’Connor, who had voted for the214
government in Leon, switched to the defense in Krull.  Moreover, she wrote the
dissent in Krull.215
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 220 & 574 n.29 (2005). 
207. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
208. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
209. Id.
210. Krull, 480 U.S. at 343. 
211. Id. at 344.
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 355.
214. Between the decisions in Leon and Krull, Justice Rehnquist replaced Burger as Chief
Justice, and Justice Scalia took over Rehnquist’s seat.  See Members of the Supreme Court of
the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2008).  Rehnquist voted for the government in both cases, and Scalia in Krull duplicated
Burger’s pro-government vote in Leon.
215. Krull, 480 U.S. at 361 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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O’Connor disagreed that reliance on a magistrate’s decision was comparable
to reliance on a statute passed by a legislature.  In explaining why, the Court’s
only former legislator exhibited a hard-eyed realism that was missing in the
majority opinion.
First, she notes that “the history of the [Fourth] Amendment suggests that
legislative abuse was precisely the evil [it] was intended to eliminate.”   She216
explains why citizens have far more to fear from the legislature rather than a
single magistrate: “The legislative act . . . sweeps broadly . . . . [A] legislature’s
unreasonable authorization of searches may affect thousands or millions and will
almost always affect more than one.  Certainly the [legislature] poses a greater
threat to liberty.”  217
Justice O’Connor then politely disputes the Pollyanna-like view the Krull
majority has of legislators: “Legislators by virtue of their political role are more
often subjected to the political pressures that may threaten Fourth Amendment
values than are judicial officers.”   Clearly, her experience as Republican218
Majority Leader of the Arizona Senate provided her with a view of state
legislators very different from that of her fellow justices.
How many former Supreme Court justices with legislative experience would
have smiled knowingly at this reference to the real world?  Yet unfortunately,
O’Connor was the only justice at the time to have had legislative experience. 
And now, for the first time in American history, there is no justice with such
experience currently on the Supreme Court.219
As to the second advantage of a justice bringing experience from other
branches of government, we need only look at the backgrounds of some of the
great Chief Justices.  John Marshall, a former Congressman and Secretary of
State, was a product of the rough-and-tumble world of Virginia politics.  These
political skills were vital to his success on the Court.  Consider Jeffrey Rosen’s
comparison of Marshall with Thomas Jefferson:
Jefferson was consistently outfoxed by Marshall because
[Jefferson’s] romantic and visionary temperament, which insisted on
carrying most disputes back to first principles, tended to stake out
radical and extreme positions in the name of ideological purity.  By
contrast, Marshall, whose temperament was defined by modesty,
conviviality, moderation, and incrementalism, had a unique talent for
216. Id. at 364.
217. Id. at 365.
218. Id. at 365-66 (emphasis added).
219. It is interesting to note that Illinois—a state that knows something about the pressures
and realities of politics—later decided to reject the holding in Krull by largely adopting Justice
O’Connor’s dissent.  See People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604 (Ill. 1996).
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getting along with those who disagreed with him and for leading by
gentle persuasion.220
You must read all the opinions of the 2006 Term to appreciate just how much
the Jefferson-type personalities predominate over the Marshall-type personalities
on the Roberts Court.
Among the Chief Justices of the twentieth-century, recall that three ran on
national tickets for either President or Vice-President before becoming Chief. 
William Howard Taft, of course, was elected President and served one term.  221
Charles Evans Hughes narrowly lost to Woodrow Wilson in 1916 and also
served as Governor of New York.   Earl Warren ran for Vice-President in 1948222
and was a three-term Governor of California.   These were men who possessed223
sophisticated political skills.
Jim Newton’s biography of Warren states that his most important mentor on
the court was Hugo Black.   Not surprisingly, Warren, the product of decades224
of California politics, could find a friend in the former Senator from Alabama. 
Harry Blackmun affectionately described Black as “ever the politician, ever the
U.S. Senator still.”   Black, in turn, admired the affable personality and225
backroom political skills of yet another justice—William Brennan.  Although
Brennan had never served in elective office, his private practice, which regularly
took him into the union halls of New Jersey, provided him with street-smarts not
found in books.  Brennan’s skills led Black to declare “Bill is my heir.”  226
As intellectually talented as many of our current justices are, it would be
difficult to identify the Warren, the Black, or the Brennan on the current Court. 
In a misguided quest to pretend that mere legal competence can trump ideology,
we have instead ended up with a set of justices with remarkably narrow world
and governmental experience—and with a Supreme Court that is as ideologically
split as any in recent memory.
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Conclusion
A former clerk of Chief Justice Warren’s had this to say about his boss:
[T]he Supreme Court could not function with nine Earl Warrens. 
It would be too conscious of delivering individual justice and
perhaps too heedless of the need to construct an architecture of law. 
But [neither] . . . can the Court survive without one Warren. 
Someone needs [to guarantee] that it delivers not just abstract justice
but actual fairness.”227
Nine of any one justice—or any one type of justice—is not healthy for the
Supreme Court. 
The theme of this article is truly a modest one.  Now and forever,
conservative presidents will want to appoint conservative justices, while liberal
presidents will want liberals on the Court.  That will never change.
But we need to return to a tradition from a not-too-distant past that saw both
liberal and conservative justices coming to the Court with rich backgrounds in
the legislative and executive, as well as the judicial, branch.  We need some
justices with the “people skills” of politicians, as well as some justices coming
straight from the legal academy.  We need some justices with “street smarts” as
much as we need some justices who are intellectuals. 
We also need to remember that confirmation hearings are not merely
televised dissertation defenses.  The hearings should be something more than
bloviating senators and clueless reporters waiting to pounce on some trivial legal
gaffe.
What confirmation hearings should be seeking is suggested by Gerard
Magliocca.  He describes what he calls a “crucial point about constitutional
doctrine, which is that values determine the status of judicial decisions more than
reason.  Although some opinions are more logical than others, that is not what
usually distinguishes the landmarks from the losers.”228
It is time to once again assemble a Supreme Court comprised of justices with
the varied backgrounds and breadth of governmental experience that are
essential for work on the nation’s highest collegial court.
It’s time to leave Stepford, Connecticut far behind.
227. NEWTON, supra note 224, at 519.
228. GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION 100 (2007)
(emphasis added).
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